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The 2016 Bernie Sanders Campaign: American Socialist Populism 
Judson C. Abraham, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University  
 
Some socialists criticize Bernie Sanders’s 2016 presidential campaign, taking issue with the 
senator’s nationalism, vague presentation of socialism and revolution, and seeming preoccupation 
with class at the expense of attention to racism. This article draws from Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of populism to depict Sanders’s campaign as a legitimately socialist 
project. Laclau and Mouffe claim that left populism may evolve into socialism under certain 
conditions. One may expect Sanders’s populism to empower previously uncommitted people to 
make socialist demands. Keywords: populism, democratic socialism, Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, Bernie Sanders.  
 
Although the Vermont senator and democratic socialist Bernie Sanders energized 
scores of American progressives with his 2016 campaign for the Democratic Party’s 
presidential nomination, leftist commentators frequently criticized Sanders’s presidential bid. 
At the time, some socialists accused Sanders of appealing to shallow nationalism with his 
patriotic rhetoric and protectionist trade policies, presenting an economic reductionist 
explanation of racism, and failing to advocate genuine revolutionary socialism. This paper 
draws from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of left populism to explain how 
the 2016 Sanders campaign’s democratic socialism, despite its conceptual vagueness, was quite 
relevant to contemporary progressives’ most far-reaching aspirations. First, I argue that the 
senator’s rhetorical nationalism and conflation of economic inequality and racial injustice, 
which Sanders’s left-wing detractors found distasteful, correspond to a kind of socialism – 
socialist populism. Secondly, I argue that Sanders’s populistic language about democratic 
socialism may advance longstanding left-wing goals by opening more Americans to economic 
policy that breaks with conventional property relations. With Laclau and Mouffe’s insights, 
one may understand how Sanders’s vagueness about democratic socialism served a 
constructive purpose: the candidate was using populist rhetoric in an experimental way in 
hopes of developing a culturally appropriate socialist politics for the U.S. 
Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffe, I explain that socialist populism does two things: it 
redraws political identities and revives democracy. Populism redraws political identities by 
framing politics as an ongoing conflict between the people and the elite and equating the 
struggles of diverse subsets of the population. Populism revives democracy by provoking  
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robust confrontation between well-defined, oppositional political projects and multiplying the 
issues open to democratic intervention. Socialist populism forges social solidarity and 
invigorates democratic participation to such a grand extent that people independently begin to 
agitate for social control of production. Sanders’s 2016 populist campaign broached socialist 
populism because it sought to inspire democratic agitation for increasingly radical social 
control. As I explain how the candidate’s rhetoric dovetailed with socialist populism, I will 
question accusations that the senator’s 2016 campaign expressed uncritical nationalism, shallow 
class reductionism, and opportunistic faux socialism. Sanders’s populist presentation of 
American politics as a struggle between the people and the elite appealed to progressive 
nationalism by reclaiming the international socialist tradition and egalitarianism as part of the 
American identity. His discursive construction of the people drew a chain of equivalence 
between class issues and racial issues, which, rather than reducing race to class, illustrated how 
democratic citizenship mutually advances both racial and class struggles. Although Sanders has 
not called for the direct overthrow of capitalism or government seizure of key industries, his 
invocations of economic democracy paralleled Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of socialism as 
radical democracy. His appeals to economic democratization aimed to open the public’s 
imagination to economic policies that challenge managerial prerogatives. 
Socialist Criticisms of the Sanders Campaign 
Socialists accused Sanders’s 2016 campaign of espousing nationalistic trade policy, 
patriotic rhetoric, class reductionism, and vague definitions of revolution and socialism. 
Several leftist writers insisted that Sanders’s trade policies replicate the narrow nationalism of 
conservative isolationists by failing to back the foreign workers most harmed by free trade 
agreements like NAFTA. These critics claimed that Sanders seldom expresses support for 
strikes or higher wages in the developing world (McKean 2016; Yates 2016) and seems instead 
to have “abandoned [Eugene] Debs’s internationalism for a nationalist focus on U.S. workers” 
(Smith, A., 2015, 143). Other socialists suggested that Sanders’s nationalist viewpoint prevents 
him from adequately supporting the victims of U.S. militarism. Sanders’s anti-war messages 
have often revolved around bread and butter issues without thoughtfully addressing the 
nature of U.S. imperialism or calling for class internationalism (Martin 2016). The anti-war 
historian Rick Perlstein (2015) accused Sanders of appealing to nationalistic militarism by 
tweeting an image of the POW/MIA flag. It is unfair to suggest that Sanders never conveys 
internationalism: he praised a minimum wage increase in Bangladesh (Sanders 2011, 180), 
protested NAFTA by visiting Mexican labor organizers, and supported the Sandinista 
Revolution (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 80-85 and 225). With that being said, the critics did 
have a point. The Vermonter’s 2016 campaign did not lay out a comprehensive plan for 
opposing free trade without harming foreign workers (see Gilbert 2016) and Sanders has an 
unfortunate history of disappointing anti-war activists (Jaffe 2015, 158). 
The 2016 Sanders campaign’s language about the economic roots of racism failed to 
impress every socialist. Some left intellectuals claimed the Sanders campaign failed to 
foreground racial injustice. Critics say the campaign’s proposals to address problems facing 
black communities with job creation programs presented racial injustice as a direct outcome 
of economic inequality (e.g. Fletcher 2016). Angela Davis was among the most prominent 
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and eloquent critics of Sanders on this score. In an interview with Amy Goodman, Davis 
said that Sanders: 
engages in a kind of economic reductionism that prevents him from 
speaking…in ways that enlighten us about the persistence of racism, 
racist violence, state violence…It seems that he does not have the 
vocabulary that allows him to acknowledge the role and the influence 
that racism has played historically. He thinks that economic justice will 
automatically lead us to racial justice (2016a). 
There is truth to Davis’s critique. James Baldwin’s critique of the Henry Wallace campaign 
reveals that white American social democrats sometimes overlook the specificity of black 
struggles and their own racial blind spots while incorrectly assuming that their plans for 
entitlement expansion will resolve racism (1955, 73-84). Unfortunately for Sanders and the 
left in general, the Clinton campaign seized upon elements of this argument in a ham-fisted 
and cynical fashion (see Weigel 2016) that may obscure more nuanced interpretations of 
Sanders’s racial politics.  
Along these lines, the candidate’s decision to describe his campaign activity as part of 
a “political revolution” (Sanders 2016) peeved some socialists. Opinion pieces in Socialist 
Worker argued that Sanders distorts the very meaning of revolution, reducing it to 
opportunistic and “bogus rhetoric” (Katch 2016). Sanders has conceptualized his “political 
revolution” as a call for a broad-based coalition of average citizens to enter electoral politics, 
gain progressive control over public offices at every level throughout the country, and push 
American politics to the left (Nichols 2015). To Sanders’s critics, this depiction of revolution 
was at best narrow localism and at worst a cynical public relations campaign for the 
Democratic Party, doing little to serve mass movements oriented toward direct action or 
promote popular control of the economy. It goes without saying that Sanders’s presentation 
of revolution was quite different from historical violent revolutions like the French, Hattian, 
and Russian revolutions (Nichols 2015).  
Finally, Sanders’s critics said he diluted the concept of socialism by presenting left- 
liberalism and/or social democracy as socialism. Sanders disavows seizure of the means of 
production as a goal for his revolution and has hazily defined his socialism as a belief “that 
the middle class and the working families who produce the wealth of America deserve a 
decent standard of living and that their incomes should go up, not down” (qtd. Jaffe 2015, 
173). Yates (2016) writes that Sanders has said little about standard socialist demands like a 
proletarian revolution, the end of capitalist property relations, democratic control of 
production, social ownership of wealth, or a guaranteed minimum income. Even Sanders’s 
sympathizer Harry Jaffe claimed that Sanders is not a socialist at all, but rather a populist or 
just a very progressive liberal (2015, 173-174).  
But what if socialism and populism are not separate categories? Ernesto Laclau 
argues that all successful socialist projects require populist mobilization and that even 
populist projects that do not appear at first glance to resemble socialism may come to 
advance socialism. Laclau believes that all socialism requires deep rootedness in national 
political culture and that political relations vary dramatically from country to country. 
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Sophisticated socialists use populism as a tool to integrate their politics with local conditions 
and values. Mature socialist projects will look dramatically different in different places. It is 
thus useless to apply a cookie-cutter definition of socialism across various countries and 
historical moments. Movements that appear, from the outside, as anti-intellectual, 
ideologically incoherent, or opportunistic often contain a radically egalitarian energy and 
evolve in socialist directions over time. Populism draws people into radical politics and, 
even if many populists do not begin by espousing recognizably socialist politics, all populist 
mobilizations will eventually snowball into socialist demands for popular control of the 
economy unless right-wing populists co-opt them. The only things that make populism turn 
right-wing are racism and/or technocracy (Laclau 1979, 158, 165, 173-174, and 196-198). In 
what follows, I argue that the 2016 campaign used populism in an experimental attempt to 
develop a form of socialism most appropriate for contemporary, American political culture 
and open Americans’ minds to robust, interventionist economic policies that challenge 
conventional property relations. 
Laclau and Mouffe on Left Populism 
Laclau and Mouffe say populism has two main functions. Populism is, first, a way for 
political actors to redraw the frontiers of political relations by uniting as many people as 
possible against the elite establishment and, second, a way to reenergize and deepen 
democracy. Populist political projects redraw political frontiers by establishing hegemony over 
many diverse actors throughout complex societies. This process involves reclaiming popular 
issues and political symbolism and associating them with the demands of many different 
subjects and interest groups at once. In so doing, populists establish a new revolutionary 
subjectivity by forging equivalence chains linking many different groups together as one 
people. Populism regenerates democracy by inciting political passion and extending the reach 
of democratic politics beyond the public sphere’s traditional boundaries. Populist political 
projects become increasingly necessary as leftists respond to the social complexity of advanced 
capitalism. 
Before covering how and why populism redraws political frontlines and resuscitates 
democracy, I must briefly touch upon Laclau and Mouffe’s thoughts on capitalism and the 
revolutionary subject. Orthodox Marxism presents capitalism as a mode of production marked 
by wage labor and industrial production. This orthodoxy holds that capitalism will inevitably 
develop to the point in which an industrial working class is large and geographically 
concentrated enough to have immediately shared, recognizable political and economic 
interests. This mature, homogenized proletariat will have the ability to act as an independent, 
revolutionary subject to seize political power and recreate society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 72- 
75). Laclau and Mouffe reject the orthodox view because advanced capitalism spreads social 
complexity, not social standardization. Laclau thinks that capitalism is not strictly a mode of 
production, but rather a complex, global array of interlocking economic, military, and political 
strategies. Capitalism, especially as it exists in the post-industrial West, does not rely on masses 
of factory workers with shared economic and political interests. It requires many different 
kinds of people, with many conflicting interests, to do its bidding (Laclau 2005a, 230-231; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 159-160). 
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Some politicians, activists, and intellectuals respond to the increasing complexity of 
capitalism by abandoning long-standing left formations, such as mass left-wing political 
parties embedded in the labor movement, on the basis that traditional left practices and 
ideology are irrelevant for countries without a clearly defined working class and a 
homogenous manufacturing base (Laclau 2005a, 85). Center-left democrats abandon old-
fashioned left parties and discourses in favor of milquetoast “third way” centrism. Anarchists 
may abandon left parties in favor of a politics based exclusively in civil society activism 
(Mouffe 2013, 119 and 135). Laclau and Mouffe respond to the fragmentation of class 
identities in the opposite fashion. Although there can be no singular revolutionary actor 
based in production, Laclau and Mouffe say that the left must retain centralized, long-
standing, stable institutions like mass parties to engage in the long- term process of 
discursively constructing a new left-wing identity.1 People will not immediately imagine 
themselves as part of a new revolutionary subject; they need to learn how to think of 
themselves this way by interacting with stable political institutions over the long term. This 
new revolutionary subject is the people. Populism is the process of uniting a very diverse set 
of groups displaced by globalized capitalism with contradictory interests under a common 
identity as the people (Laclau 2005a, 223-232). 
The people is not a preexisting force that politicians may awaken at will. The people is 
an imaginary category that political actors recreate in new contexts. Populists use floating 
signifiers, empty signifiers, and equivalence chains to establish the people. Floating signifiers 
are symbols and/or issues with no inherent ideological meaning that people vaguely associate 
with rebellion. These issues and symbols appeal to a broad cross-section of the public, 
including many people who identify as left-wing and others who identify as right-wing. 
Empty signifiers (which often overlap with floating signifiers) are singular issues and/or 
symbols that can represent many other issues and causes at once. Empty signifiers are the “tip 
of the iceberg.” Equivalence chains are broad coalitions of people who imagine their struggles 
as immediately linked, such that the victory of one struggle advances several other struggles 
at once. Left populists form expansive equivalence chains that unite a broad section of people 
by appealing to empty signifiers and floating signifiers to give popular causes a leftist 
connotation (see Laclau 2005b). This process redraws political divisions in society around 
new fault lines. Although left populism maintains and reinforces the division between the left 
and the right, it transforms what one associates with the left and the right: a “vibrant 
democratic politics can no longer be conceived in terms of the traditional left-right axis” 
(Mouffe 2016). 
Although left populism reinterprets popular symbols and issues to appeal to people 
who are otherwise right-wing, it is not non-partisan. Populism is a deeply partisan process 
that forms a people in opposition to an elite. Forging broad equivalence chains requires 
uniting as many people as possible in opposition to a narrowly defined enemy. Politics 
 
1 Laclau and Mouffe do not reject civil society activity and they have enthusiastically supported Occupy and the 
alter-globalization movement. Mouffe wants these movements to act synergistically with left parties, much as Syriza 
and Podemos have drawn energy from the Syntagma Square and Indignados protest movements. 
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involves “we vs. they” thinking and passionate, angry denunciations of opponents. In 
healthy, pluralist democracies, political parties compete for votes by developing well-defined, 
oppositional platforms and identities. However, in contemporary society, mainstream left 
and right-wing parties have forged a consensus around neoliberal economic projects. The left 
and right are now indistinguishable in the eyes of many disaffected voters. It is up to 
populists to restore passionate, polarizing conflict to democracy by appealing to the people in 
opposition to the corrupt elite (Mouffe 2005b). Doing so will encourage the public to 
reimagine themselves as the people and, in so doing, begin to create a new left-wing 
subjectivity to replace the international proletariat as the revolutionary subject (see Laclau 
2014, 172-176). 
The project of congealing a new identity of the people around a set of popular empty 
and floating signifiers does not happen overnight and does not require reinventing the wheel. 
It involves long-term work within the state and appeals to existing political traditions. Left 
populism involves radical democracy, which entails the constant expansion of the democratic 
state into more areas of social life, the proliferation of platforms for democratic decision 
making, and the creation of a new equivalential identity based on a shared identity of 
citizenship. Laclau and Mouffe embrace the welfare state and want to extend it, deepen it, and 
democratize it. They want to redraw the old division between the public and private spheres 
so that democratic decision-making and issue-formation may occur in so-called private realms 
like the family and the economy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 140-141 and 160-168). This extension 
of democracy into new territory need not require invasive state or party absorption of these 
fields. It may involve heightened synergy between political parties and protest movements 
focusing on economic and social issues (Mouffe, interviewed by Hackl 2014). Under radical 
democracy, various social groups relate to each other through the political tradition of 
democratic citizenship, which allows them to maintain a healthy degree of tension between 
solidarity and autonomy without sacrificing solidarity to autonomy. If left populists draw 
from the tradition of citizenship to equate the demands of racial minorities, feminists, 
environmentalists, and labor movements (despite the fact that these demands may not always 
harmonize), then people will consider all of these groups’ struggles relevant to democracy. 
Thus, a victory for each of these social groups will be a victory for all of them because each 
demand will advance the shared cause of democracy (Mouffe 1993, 18-20 and 70-72). Finally, 
Mouffe (2009) stresses that radical democracy occurs within and around the democratic state 
through a drawn-out process of identity formation and state consolidation comparable to 
Gramsci’s war of position. We have thus seen that left populism responds to advanced 
capitalism’s fragmentation and dispersion of social identities to form a new unified identity of 
“the people” by working within the state to polarize society, deepen and expand democracy, 
and forge a new equivalence that redraws the left around popular issues and symbols. 
Sanders’s Nationalism as Left Populism 
Political actors establish populist discourses to forge unity among broad swaths of 
society that cannot necessarily connect through any shared relationship to the means of 
production. In order to establish this broad unity and construct the people, populists 
frequently highlight popular issues and national symbolism with cross-class appeal. In Politics 
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and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Laclau explains that the inter-war German left failed to stem the 
rise of Nazism because both communists and social democrats refused to reach out to the 
middle class in any meaningful way. The left rejected patriotism as bourgeois, which led some 
socialists to do asinine things like express support for the Treaty of Versailles. The German 
left’s class analysis was so rigid that many of them refused to take up popular issues, such as 
the declining living standards of white-collar professionals, because these were not strictly 
working class issues. 
Laclau uses this history to suggest that the best way to fight the far right and gain left-
wing institutional power is to forge cross-class alliances through a left populist embrace of 
national dignity and attractive cultural symbolism. He objects to the idea that certain issues 
or symbols have an inherent class nature. The political meaning of an issue depends not on 
its content, but rather on which class hegemonizes the struggle over the issue’s 
implementation (Laclau 1979, 92-100; 113-114; 124-129; 162). If the bourgeoisie imbues national 
symbolism and popular issues with a bourgeois connotation, then nationalism will be 
conservative. If the proletariat imbues national symbolism and popular issues with a 
working class connotation, then nationalism will be progressive. 
Hence, it is entirely possible and even necessary for left populists to draw from 
nationalist symbolism and lay claim to issues with broad national appeal, even if these same 
issues resonate with people who do not consistently identify with the left. Take Sanders’s 
decision to tweet an image of the POW/MIA flag, which Perlstein found distasteful. Sanders 
embraces national symbolism because it unifies a broad group of people, including military 
veterans, whose interests the left cannot afford to abandon to the right. Sanders strives to 
bestow patriotism with a left-wing connotation. Sanders appeals to historical figures like 
Eugene V. Debs, Emma Goldman, and Mother Jones to show that his socialism is part of a 
grand American radical tradition. His left nationalism depicts economic justice as compatible 
with the inherent egalitarianism of the American spirit and the voting public’s true wishes 
(Foster 2016; Sanders and Gutman 2015, 20 and 27). His decision to embrace certain 
nationalistic themes, such as the middle class’s wellbeing, veterans’ issues, and the symbolism 
that accompanies these issues is a left populism compatible with socialist politics. 
Much like his appeals to military symbols, Sanders’s statements about globalization 
irked a few internationalists. Reflecting on Sanders’s critiques of global trade during the 2016 
campaign cycle, Tobita Chow (2018) regrets that Sanders usually fell “short of full-throated 
solidarity with Chinese workers” and did not advocate for a global minimum wage and 
technology transfers. While I share Chow’s frustration with American political discourse’s 
tendency to oversimplify trade policy, I find that Mouffe’s work lends itself to a more 
charitable reading of the senator’s rhetoric. Mouffe sympathizes with alter-globalist 
development policies like those Chow advocates. However, she is wary of cosmopolitanism 
and urges activists to ground global justice in efforts to build the democratic capacities of the 
nation state. Mouffe claims that left parties will have to expand popular identification with the 
democratic state and attain hegemony through the state’s institutions before they can 
successfully retool multilateral institutions to reconcile labor standards across borders (Mouffe 
2005a, 100-110). Much as Mouffe would have it, the 2016 Sanders campaign provided renewed 
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focus to the alter- globalization cause by demonstrating that once-marginal progressive critics 
of neoliberalism can and should attain state power (Denvir 2019). Sanders’s anti-austerity 
messaging linked together popular sovereignty, progressive nationalism, and internationalism. 
As undemocratic, neocolonial austerians failed to treat Puerto Ricans as full American citizens, 
Sanders explained that expanding elected Puerto Rican politicians’ abilities to negotiate debt 
restructuring with their creditors would serve as a blow to the same financiers who 
impoverished Greece (Sanders, interviewed by Goodman, 2015; Nichols 2016). Sanders thus 
implies that the way forward for alter-globalization is for activists to find concrete ways to 
connect their global concerns to the enhancement of democratic citizenship at home. 
Race, Equivalence, and Left Populism 
In addition to redrawing political fault lines by appealing to popular national issues 
and symbols, left populism forges new political solidarities by equating multiple social 
struggles. During political crises, populists can do more than form cross-class alliances. They 
may establish entirely new identities of people who believe their diverse struggles are 
inherently linked and think the progress of one group’s struggle advances the struggles of 
several other groups at once. According to Laclau and Mouffe, under normal circumstances, 
systems of differences frame social identities. When social identities have differential links, 
people understand their identities based on who they are different from (e.g. one knows that 
he is a man because he is not a woman; one knows that he is a worker because he is not 
unemployed). However, during periods of crisis, logics of equivalence may displace logics of 
difference. In these instances, one issue or symbol may gain such emotional appeal that people 
who embrace it feel as though they all share the same identity. Even if one group is not 
immediately impacted by the struggles of another group, they will equate their identities in 
such a way as to feel an instinctual, immediate connection to distant struggles (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 126-128 and 164). 
Equivalential logics only replace differential logics during political crises. Equivalential 
identities form in times of instability in which people realize how their social identities are 
areas of political conflict. Differential identities (e.g. women’s traditional roles in family 
institutions and blue-collar workers’ roles in corporate economic hierarchies) appear apolitical 
and neutral– they are just part of a natural order of difference. Differential identities become 
equivalential when social orders degenerate and the illusion of their neutrality disappears. 
When every social identity becomes a platform for political struggle, social movement actors 
are both more likely to reclaim their identities as autonomous groups with distinct political 
interests and more likely to equate themselves to other movements (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
135-136). 
Consider two of Laclau and Mouffe’s hypothetical examples of equivalence overtaking 
difference during crises. They say feminist identities based on the supposed unity of women 
around their shared biological sex are differential, assuming sisterhood to stem from a natural, 
apolitical difference. However, during crises, feminists may come to recognize the political 
construction of the category of women and see themselves as divided by class and race. Crisis 
pushes feminists to better appreciate their connections to the struggles of other social 
movements, such as anti-racist and union movements. Crisis sparks partisanship and division 
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in previously apolitical social spaces and, in so doing, inspires more and more social identities 
to organize autonomously. In another hypothetical example, Laclau and Mouffe say black 
workers are more likely to organize autonomously as blacks when they gain experience and 
political connections by organizing as workers in labor organizations. These workers may 
come to equate conflicts between workers and capitalists with conflicts between racists and 
people of color while recognizing such conflicts’ autonomy. Crisis generates equivalence by 
uncovering the divisions within social groups, thereby foregrounding their connections to 
other social groups. Crisis encourages autonomy by pushing some social groups to organize, 
which in turn creates a ripple effect and causes other social groups to organize independently 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 130-134 and 140-141). 
Left populist projects are uniquely capable of responding to crises by articulating 
equivalence between broad, diverse struggles without threatening various social movements’ 
autonomy. Left populists use statism and partisanship to maintain very broad equivalential 
identities and autonomy. Left populists mark each social identity in their equivalence chains as 
political by relating them to citizenship and the democratic state. Left populists interpret the 
political conflicts shaping class, racial, and gender identities through the lens of citizenship and 
democracy, thereby marking these identities as spaces for the exercise of democratic 
participation. Populists cultivate the polarization and intense political conflict of crisis periods 
long after the crisis’s resolution by rhetorically projecting an ongoing conflict between the 
people and the elite and building lasting movements of the people within representative 
institutions. Shared commitments to defending and expanding political and economic 
democracy unite various social movements through the left populist discourse, allowing 
groups with conflicting interests to view themselves as sharing a momentous struggle (Laclau 
1990, 148- 153). Left populist discourse’s emphasis on citizenship encourages people to hold 
split identities that are simultaneously equivalential and autonomous. A white left populist 
feminist, for example, may relate to union workers and racial minorities as a citizen while 
relating to other women as a woman (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 62-63). 
Sanders is a left populist who fosters equivalencies between diverse groups of people. 
During his 2016 campaign, he constantly referred to economic inequality even while he was 
talking about racism. Sanders stressed democracy and civic engagement as unifying principles 
establishing an equivalential subjectivity. His language linked class and race through an active 
defense of democracy: 
We are facing a two-pronged attack on our democracy — unlimited money 
poured into the political process, paired with the systematic suppression of the 
vote. These are two sides of the same coin. Make no mistake: the billionaire class 
does not want Americans to vote…The fight for minority voting rights is a fight 
for justice. It is also inseparable from the struggle for democracy itself. When the 
votes of minorities are suppressed, it becomes easier for politicians who 
represent billionaires and corporations to win and hold elected office (Sanders 
2015). 
Sanders attempted to hold this equivalence chain together through a politically charged and 
divisive rhetoric of citizenship and democracy. The citizens in this chain have split identities. 
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They share an identity as citizens, but they maintain autonomous identities as racial subjects 
and workers. This autonomy does not preclude solidarity. For example, Killer Mike (2016) is 
a black separatist who advocates for black autonomy and self-sufficiency and his first tweet 
endorsing Sanders specifically appealed to the senator’s support for defending and 
expanding the Voting Rights Act (Holpuch 2015). Recall that Angela Davis accused Sanders 
of ignoring the specificity of black concerns. To understand how the 2016 Sanders campaign 
was relevant to black issues in their specificity, it is necessary to consider how black activists 
are responding to a political crisis – the legitimacy crisis of mainstream black leadership – 
and forming new equivalential identities in the process. 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) draws energy from the black community’s internal divisions. 
BLM activists are exhausted with the black political class’s hesitancy and moderation. They 
join with labor and left groups to work on issues long ignored and belittled by mainstream 
black political operatives and, in the process, establish a new political identity that is both 
autonomous and equivalential (Petersen-Smith 2015). Ferguson protestors developed their 
radicalism and militancy in part by joining the Fight for Fifteen in the months before Michael 
Brown’s death and view their work for racial justice as intertwined with their labor activism 
(Smith, B. 2015). Angela Davis has explained how BLM breaks with mainstream, pro-Israel 
Democrats to foster sympathy for Palestine as a central element of the struggle for racial 
justice. Moreover, Davis has shown that this sympathy is equivalential: many black activists do 
not just appeal to workers and Palestinians as potential allies for specific causes, but rather 
emotionally and instinctually interpret their struggles as inherently linked (see Davis, 
interviewed by Goodman 2016b). As BLM drew closer to Palestine and labor militancy, the 
divisions between the black activist left and black neoliberal Democrats became more visible 
and bitter (see Khalek 2016). 
The crisis of the black leadership class’s legitimacy welds together this equivalence 
chain between Palestinians, low-wage workers, and black victims of police brutality. The 
Sanders campaign’s left populism may have encouraged the long-term maintenance and 
expansion of this equivalence chain. Left populism is polarizing and spreads anger and 
political conflict throughout many layers of society. The 2016 Sanders campaign magnified 
divisions within the black community over the drug war, Palestine, support for centrists, and 
other issues. The campaign reverberated with black activists’ autonomous efforts to highlight 
these divisions, spurn a political realignment of the black community, and affirm solidarity 
with other oppressed groups. Sanders’s left populism gave an institutional voice to this anger 
with centrist liberals and sought to sustain this anger through long-term electoral politics, 
which might reinforce these equivalential identities over time. Cornel West’s statement 
endorsing Sanders illustrates how the campaign’s left populism enabled equivalence and 
autonomy through long-term, partisan organizing. West appealed to a state of crisis, anger 
with mainstream Democrats, solidarity with Palestine, and Sanders’s focus on long-term 
movement building all in one short statement: 
My endorsement of Brother Bernie in the primaries is not an affirmation of the 
neo- liberal Democratic Party or a downplaying of the immorality of the ugly 
Israeli occupation of Palestinians. I do so because he is a long-distance runner 
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with integrity in the struggle for justice for over 50 years. Now is the time for his 
prophetic voice to be heard across our crisis-ridden country, even as we push 
him with integrity toward a more comprehensive vision of freedom for all (qtd. 
Tesfaye 2016) 
West likewise lambasted mainstream black Democrats like John Lewis and Jim Clyburn for 
their opposition to Sanders and called them out for their neoliberalism (Mims 2016). Black 
Democrats’ exasperation with Sanders and West (see Kopan and Labott 2016) suggests that 
Sanders’s political revolution helped keep the political divisions BLM fomented on people’s 
minds for an extended period. From this perspective, Sanders’s appeals to the middle and 
working classes were not attempts to sidestep the issue of race, but rather statements of 
equivalence. Left populism’s statism, appeals to citizenship, and vigorous partisanship allow 
crisis to continue long enough for equivalential political realignment. Fighting, politicized 
equivalence reconciles tensions between autonomy and solidarity. 
One may argue that Sanders’s 2016 campaign experimented with populist rhetoric in 
an attempt to create an equivalence chain linking people of color facing police brutality and 
voter suppression, Palestinians and others disadvantaged by U.S. foreign policy, and 
organized labor. Although Sanders failed to secure most black primary voters in 2016, he did 
win over young black voters by a respectable margin (Bacon 2016). Laclau and Mouffe’s 
thoughts on populism lend themselves to an analysis of Sanders’s populism because the 
theorists stress how internal divisions within identity communities facilitate solidarity among 
oppositional groups seeking access to power. The Sanders campaign spoke to political 
divisions between young black critics of American policing and a more complacent older 
generation, black labor activists and neoliberal Democratic Party leaders, and defenders of 
America’s relationship with Israel and international solidarity activists.2 Sanders and his 
supporters within the black community appealed to citizenship and voting rights in an 
attempt to subsume and synthesize many issues related to the misuse of state authority at 
home and abroad. The experiment did not yield a political victory, but it did expose 
generational, class, and ideological rifts in black politics that will be of interest to political 
scientists and campaigners in future elections. 
Sanders on Revolution and Socialism 
In the 2016 election cycle, some socialists criticized Sanders for failing to define and 
apply the terms revolution and socialism clearly and consistently. Laclau and Mouffe’s work 
allows for a more generous interpretation of Sanders’s appeals to socialism and revolution. 
Sanders is a specific type of socialist, a left populist socialist. As a socialist populist, Sanders 
seeks to resolve advanced capitalism’s problems by extending democracy throughout many 
layers of society, both public and private. Sanders has called himself a “leftist populist” and 
sees his populism as a means to bring together broad and surprising coalitions, such as 
movements of “low-income people, hard-pressed working class homeowners, 
 
2 Jesse Jackson’s bid for the Democratic Party nomination similarly exposed deep rifts within the black community 
over U.S. support for Israel (see Marable 1984). 
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environmentalists, renters, trade unionists, college students, and now the police” (Sanders and 
Gutman 2015, 40). Laclau and Mouffe write that spreading democratic control over all sectors of 
public life provokes the masses to establish a type of socialism appropriate for their historical 
and political context. Even if the people do not consciously conceive of extending democracy as 
socialism, democratizing social spaces eventually encourages people to fight for decision-
making power over the economy. Left populists do not rely on the strictures of Marxist theory 
for a predetermined blueprint of what this democratic oversight of the economy will look like. 
Left populist approaches to revolution and socialist politics need not resemble violent socialist 
revolutions and actually existing socialisms of the twentieth century. Democratic agitation that 
leads people to seek decision-making power over the economy, even if it does not overtly call 
for recognizably socialist endpoints, amounts to a contextually appropriate revolutionary 
politics. 
Socialists have long aspired to gain working class control of the means of production. 
Laclau and Mouffe adjust this conception of socialism for contemporary realities of advanced 
capitalism. Socialism is not only government or union ownership of the means of production, 
but also the extension of democratic input into economic decision making for many social 
groups, including environmentalists, local communities, workers, and consumer advocates. 
Under complicated, contemporary conditions, handing complete control of production to the 
direct producers would amount to privileging special interest groups over many other social 
groups whose work maintains a diversified, globalized economic system. The specific 
mechanisms for democratically coordinating these complex interests will vary from country to 
country and sector to sector; people must learn which methods of economic decision-making 
are appropriate for their social spaces through grassroots struggles in contact with broader 
political movements and parties. Nationalizing all major industries can hardly serve as a 
standard goal for contemporary socialism. Laclau insists that one cannot judge how left-wing a 
government is by how many industries it nationalizes. Instead, the task is to reformulate 
socialism as broad-based participation in economic production along with government support 
for the well-being of all kinds of people. This includes policies geared toward supporting the 
underemployed precariat, such as a universal basic income, a shortened workweek, and 
government support for workers cooperatives and workers in the informal economy (Mouffe 
2000, 126; Laclau 1990, xii-xv; Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 178). Recall that Laclau says left 
populism, as it continually integrates more and more social groups into the democratic process, 
may evolve into socialism because these groups will eventually come to demand democratic 
influence over economic decisions. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the revolutionary process is the process by which populists 
catalyze mass interest in radical democracy among extremely diverse sections of the 
population. Revolution entails long-term social change that transforms the identity of all social 
groups involved in production. They define revolution as “the overdetermination of a set of 
struggles in a point of political rupture, from which there follow a variety of effects spread 
across the whole fabric of society” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 177). In other words, 
revolutionary actions are those that ripple across the whole of society, polarizing and 
politicizing more and more social identities over time. Laclau and Mouffe conceive of their 
revolution as a continual, ongoing strengthening and deepening of historical democratic 
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revolutions, such as the French and American Revolutions. Just as the initial stages of the 
French and American Revolutions spread democracy to one social group, white men, these 
revolutions continue over many years as more and more people gain access to the democratic 
rights associated with these revolutions. The ripple effect not only broadens, but also deepens 
democracy as the areas of social life in which democratic participation is possible multiply. As 
the democratic revolutions culminate, citizen participants will no longer merely vote for 
representatives, but also engage in political decision making in so-called private spheres, such 
as the workplace and the family (Laclau 1990, 187- 188; 227-229). 
It is crucial to note that Laclau and Mouffe do not see this revolutionary process as a 
subordination of all social spaces and identities to formal state institutions. Rather, democracy 
spreads throughout all layers of the social as social movements proliferate across social life and 
generate democratic demands for their political representatives to fulfill. Centralized parties 
must not prioritize one democratic struggle over others or smother their development with 
preconceived conceptions of socialism (Mouffe 2013, 75-76). Populist parties should rather 
discursively equate variegated struggles. In short, revolution involves spreading democratic 
participation by more and more people into more and more spaces that society previously 
considered off limits for politics. Independent social movements work alongside and within 
representative institutions to push forward the democratic revolution that generates socialism. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of revolution resonates with Sanders’s calls for a 
political revolution. He sees revolution as increased democratic participation among many, 
regular people from very different backgrounds. Sanders does not only intend for his 
campaigns to win him offices. The senator says that the purpose of his electoral bids are to get 
various underdogs who have been discouraged from political participation (e.g. minorities, the 
poor) to assert themselves. He frames his campaigns as attempts to get more working people 
involved in government, make political participation fun and interesting, and get more people 
thinking about the important issues (like classism and trade) that big news networks and 
mainstream Democrats typically ignore (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 32, 76, and 207). Sanders 
intended for his 2016 presidential campaign not only to advance his career but also to 
galvanize many people to run for office and participate in progressive social movements 
throughout the country. The campaign was a “political revolution” because it recognized that 
fundamental change does not come from one struggle on one platform at a time; many 
different movements (both electoral and non- electoral) must work in tandem to further deep 
structural changes (Jaffe 2015, 166-167). Echoing Mouffe, the Sanders campaign recognized that 
extending democratic participation throughout society must not only involve popular 
engagement with representative government. Revolutionary change entails active social 
movements. In his words: 
Real change – whether it is the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, 
the gay movement, or the environmental movement – real change never comes 
because some guy sitting in the Oval Office says: ‘Oh gee, I think that’s a good 
idea.’ Real change only happens when millions of people stand up and demand 
their civil rights (qtd. Roberts 2015). 
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Sanders therefore understood his 2016 campaign as a way to respond to democratic social 
movements without coopting or controlling them. He considered running for president only 
after witnessing how the Occupy movement had opened Americans’ minds to radical 
economic policy and insurgent leftist campaigns (Jaffe 2015, 162-163). Sanders’s decision to 
allow disruptive BLM demonstrators to take his microphone (see Hains 2015) also revealed his 
simultaneous closeness to and independence from radical social movements. Much like Laclau 
and Mouffe’s notion of the democratic revolution, Sanders’s political revolution has aimed at 
drawing more social groups into the democratic process by inspiring both grassroots electoral 
campaigns and active participation in left social movements. 
In 2016, Sanders’s conception of democratic socialism, much like his depiction of 
revolution, appeared rather vague. However, Sanders’s presentation of democratic socialism 
nonetheless parallels Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist understanding of contemporary 
socialism. Much like Laclau and Mouffe’s insistence upon spreading economic decision-
making power to more people with various relationships to the means of production, Sanders 
calls for more layers of democratic participation over economic policy-making. Sanders 
expresses a vision of “economic democracy” that involves the participation of the poor in 
setting economic policy. Under economic democracy, the poor will not only thwart right-wing 
attempts to block their participation, but also be considered key voices and consultants in the 
crafting of economic policy. Sanders believes that the U.S. can only address major economic 
problems, such as inadequate health services and unemployment, by involving more people in 
the democratic process. The poor have the solutions; politicians need to listen (Sanders and 
Gutman 2015, 20-26 and 272). Like Laclau and Mouffe, Sanders has responded to the decline of 
the classical proletariat by proposing policies aimed at assisting the precariat. Sanders is 
deeply concerned with overwork, contingent labor, and low-wage labor in the post-Fordist 
economy. While his solutions are not exactly the same as Mouffe’s, he does say that the 
government should guarantee a job to any unemployed person who wants one, promote 
workers cooperatives, and advocate for policies like a fifteen dollar minimum wage to assist 
low-income people (Sanders and Gutman 2015, 289-291; Johnson 2015). This approach to 
socialism hardly fits with classical Marxism, but it does work with Laclau and Mouffe’s idea of 
contemporary socialism as a radicalization and extension of democracy. 
 Thinking alongside Laclau and Mouffe, one may generously interpret the Sanders 
campaign’s vague language about socialism and revolution as a rhetorical experiment aimed at 
opening Americans’ minds to broader conceptions of democratic participation than mere 
representative democracy. Sanders sees democracy as a broader category than just competitive 
elections for representative office. His 2016 campaign associated democracy with a renewed 
labor movement and vibrant social movements setting the national agenda. His campaign was 
thus attempting to overcome problems that have long hindered the American left. Gar 
Alperovitz, a prominent defender of worker ownership, argues that the U.S. middle class is too 
large and complacent to respond to a left politics that appeals to violent revolution. However, 
Alperovitz suggests that deep reforms at the level of American political economy may well be 
possible if political leaders manage to funnel Americans’ anger with corporate consolidation 
and wealth inequality into well-coordinated, practical, grassroots political initiatives and 
alternative workplace experiments (2011, xxv-xxvi and 226-228). Uniting the suburban middle 
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class with less privileged groups is an enormous difficulty facing efforts to cohere scattered, 
progressive, grassroots activists across the U.S. into a focused, effective political force capable of 
making a dent in economic inequality (Alperovitz 2011, 170-179). Building cross-class alliances 
for unorthodox economic proposals is tricky because the framers designed the U.S. constitution 
to prevent popular forces from coming together across geographic boundaries and deification of 
the founding documents often prevents Americans from looking beyond representative politics 
to embrace more participatory, expansive forms of democracy (Dahl 2003, 1-10 and 50-53). 
There are some indications that the 2016 Sanders campaign achieved marginal success in 
reaching unlikely groups and opening their minds to the possibility of more democratic 
participation in economic decision-making, more active cooperation between radical social 
movements and major political parties, and farther-reaching state interventions to support the 
underclasses. Some young people testify that the Sanders phenomenon has pushed them away 
from despairing apathy or mainline liberalism and toward a social democratic standpoint 
focused squarely on increasing the social wage (see McGreal 2017). Shortly after the 2016 
elections, many of Sanders’s backers challenged both the far right and the center left by 
mobilizing around a militant resistance movement inspired in part by the senator’s critiques of 
the Democratic Party leadership and mainstream liberal nonprofits (see Young 2018, 8-9; Knight 
2016). Some expect the Sanders-influenced resistance movement to advance economic 
democracy: 
The work of making a pivot to a twenty-first-century Democratic Party…will fall 
to the generation of Sanders activists who are clearly the Democrats’ future. 
Causes that go beyond those that Sanders have articulated—giving workers 
equal power on corporate boards; requiring employers to provide decent pay 
and benefits to all their workers, whether in traditional employer-employee 
relationships or not; greatly increasing the level of public provision for 
healthcare, child care, senior care and education; changing tax policy so that the 
share of income going to work increases and that going to investment 
decreases—these will be the kinds of issues that the young people activated by 
the Sanders campaign will raise, if they’re to go forward in the same spirit that 
led them to Sanders in the first place (Meyerson 2016). 
Given that Sanders’s attempt to bring the Democratic party closer to militant social 
movements may nudge forward far-reaching progressive economic reforms, those seeking to 
expand democratic participation beyond traditional representative democracy would do well 
to study Sanders’s 2016 attempt to use populist rhetoric to retool concepts of revolution and 
socialism for present conditions. 
Conclusion 
This article has responded to Sanders’s socialist critics by presenting Sanders’s 2016 
campaign as an experiment with left populism. Viewing Sanders as a left populist suggests a 
more generous interpretation of certain elements of the 2016 campaign that some leftists find 
disquieting, such as Sanders’s nationalist rhetoric, tendency to conflate race and class 
oppressions, and seemingly inappropriate uses of the terms revolution and socialism. I find that 
maintaining a focus on Sanders’s 2016 efforts helps highlight the senator’s populism: the 
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candidate’s 2020 campaign presented more specific, detailed explanations of democratic 
socialism (see Sanders 2019) and progressive internationalism (see Sanders 2018), so his reliance 
on populist speech to convey his socialist politics was even more apparent in 2016. Sanders 
used populism in 2016 to introduce international solidarity to American audiences unprepared 
for a clean break with patriotic nationalism. Sanders stressed citizenship to appeal to people of 
color by forging equivalential associations between opposition to neoliberalism and opposition 
to racism. Sanders spoke of revolution and democratic socialism to inspire popular interest in 
economic democracy and encourage Democratic Party leaders to be more responsive to 
progressive social movements. For socialism to become a mainstream political force in the U.S., 
socialists may first have to build on Sanders’s experiment by carefully constructing appeals that 
speak to American political and cultural divides. Doing so will require an openness to forms of 
socialist thought that speak to the possibilities open within the existing political system at the 
present moment. 
This article has not tried to claim that Sanders, or any other charismatic socialist, can 
overcome the longstanding obstacles to left politics under advanced capitalism with populist 
speeches alone. European left populist parties have had enormous difficulty holding together 
coalitions of educated, cosmopolitan young people and older blue-collar workers (see Jäger 
2019). A Sanders presidency would likely meet similar challenges maintaining unity among the 
democratic socialist’s base. Even as president, Sanders would have a rough time implementing 
his most ambitious policy proposals. Given that gridlock is a feature of the U.S. constitution, 
Sanders’s goal of amending the constitution to overturn the Citizens United (see Prokop 2015) 
decision may be unfeasible for even the most skilled of populists. Nonetheless, I find that 
paying attention to the Vermonter’s populism helps identify the Sanders phenomenon’s 
potentials. Observers who look beyond orthodox Marxism to appreciate Laclau and Mouffe’s 
post-Marxist outlook will have an easier time grasping the purpose and possibilities of 
Sanders’s populist rhetoric. 
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